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Abstract
Secure model aggregation across many users is a key component of federated learning systems. The
state-of-the-art protocols for secure model aggregation, which are based on additive masking, require
all users to quantize their model updates to the same level of quantization. This severely degrades
their performance due to lack of adaptation to available bandwidth at different users. We propose three
schemes that allow secure model aggregation while using heterogeneous quantization. This enables
the users to adjust their quantization proportional to their available bandwidth, which can provide a
substantially better trade-off between the accuracy of training and the communication time. The proposed
schemes are based on a grouping strategy by partitioning the network into groups, and partitioning the
local model updates of users into segments. Instead of applying aggregation protocol to the entire local
model update vector, it is applied on segments with specific coordination between users. We theoretically
evaluate the quantization error for our schemes, and also demonstrate how our schemes can be utilized
to overcome Byzantine users.
Index Terms
Federated Learning, secure aggregation, heterogeneous quantization, Byzantine robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federated learning (FL) is gaining significant interests as it enables mobile users to collab-
oratively learn a shared inference model while keeping all the training data on device [1], [2].
In this framework, the goal of the server is to learn a global model parameter vector, θ ∈ Rm,
Ahmed Roushdy Elkordy and A. Salman Avestimehr are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, University of
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2Fig. 1: The training process of federated learning.
by using the data held at the distributed mobile users. In general, learning the global model
parameter vector in machine learning involves the minimization of the empirical loss function
F (θ) =
1
|B|
∑
u⊂B
f(θ, u), (1)
where θ is the global model parameter vector to be optimized, f(.) is the loss function defined
by the learning task, and B is the training data set of size |B|. Finding the global parameter
vector θ is typically done by using the iterative stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm
θt+1 = θt − ηtg(θt), (2)
where g(θt) is the stochastic gradient such that E[g(θt)] = ∇F (θt), and ηt is the learning rate at
iteration t. SGD can be easily implemented distributedly across the mobile users, each of which
has access to only its own private dataset. The training process in FL by using the distributed
stochastic gradient descent is illustrated in Figure 1. At iteration t, the server sends the current
version of the global model vector, θt, to the mobile users. User i then computes its local model
vector θti based on its local dataset by using the SGD, so the local model update of each user
can be written as xti := θ
t
i − θt. This local model update could be a single gradient, or could
result from multiple steps of the SGD taken on this users local dataset. User i sends the local
model update xti to the server. The local model updates of the N users are then aggregated by
the server. The server then updates the global model θt+1 for the next round according to
θt+1 = θt +
1
N
N∑
i=1
xti. (3)
One of the key challenges to FL is the communication bottleneck created by sending the model
updates {xti}i∈N from the users to the server [3] at each iteration of the training. Researchers
3have proposed many approaches to provide a communication-efficient FL system. One of these
approaches is to use quantization which allows users to iteratively send small model updates [3]–
[7]. More specifically, quantization methods implement lossy compression of the gradient vectors
by quantizing the model updates elements to low-precision values. Seide et al. [4] propose 1-bit
SGD to reduce the size of model-updates and show empirically that if the quantization errors are
accumulated, the convergence speed will not be affected. Alistarh et al. [5], explore the trade-off
between model accuracy and gradient precision by proposing another approach called QSGD
which is based on stochastic quantization. Similar to QSGD, Wen et al. propose TernGrad [6], a
method to stochastically quantize gradients to ternary values. Another communication-efficient
approach is sparsification which can be done by selecting some entries of the model updates
at random to communicate [3], [8], or by setting a threshold value such that gradient elements
with absolute values less than this threshold will be discarded [9]–[11]. Also, reducing the
communication frequency with the server is an effective solution to provide a communication-
efficient system [12].
Another key consideration for FL system is to preserve the privacy of the users. There are
two approaches to achieve that. First, the training data stays on the user device, and users
locally perform model updates using their individual data. Second, local models can be securely
aggregated at the central server to update the global model [1], [13]–[18]. In particular, secure
aggregation can be done by using cryptographic approaches such as homomorphic encryption
that allows aggregations to be performed on encrypted data [13], [14]. The main issue with this
approach is that performing computations in the encrypted domain is computationally expensive.
Another line of work that achieves secure model aggregation is the multiparty computation (MPC)
[15]–[17]. The main limitation of this approach is that it requires high communication cost. A
recent line of works has focused on secure aggregation by using additive masking [1] and [18],
where users use random masks to mask their local model updates. The state-of-the-art secure
aggregation protocols with additive masking have some limitations which include:
• They require all users to quantize their model updates to the same level of quantization, even
if they have different transmission rates. Using the same level of quantization is necessary to
guarantee correct decoding as discussed in Section II-D. In fact, the transmission rates of the
users in FL system are different due to the variability in network connectivity (3G, 4G, 5G,
WiFi), and due to the change in the network quality over time. Hence, the performance in
FL will be dominated by the slowest users. More specifically, by making all users use a low
4level quantizer, the communication time will be small, but the accuracy will decrease. On
the other hand, by making all users use a high level quantizer the accuracy will increase, but
the communication time will also increase. In other words, a degradation in the performance
happens due to lack of adaptation of the quantization levels to the available transmission
rates at the users.
• The bandwidth expansion which results from the additional O(logN) bits that should be
communicated for each scalar in the model update vector, where N is the number of users
being summed over, to guarantee correct decoding. Hence, this expansion makes them
ineffective with aggressive quantization, specially for large N [1], [2].
• Secure aggregation protocols generally make the adaption of the existing defenses mecha-
nism against adversarial attacks difficult to implement, as the central server only sees the
masked model updates of each user as well as the aggregate of the users’ updates, while
the defense techniques are based on observing the individual clear model updates of the
users (e.g., [19]). 1
Main Contributions: The proposed strategy of the three schemes in this paper can mitigate
all of the aforementioned limitations. In particular, our main contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We develop three schemes that allow for secure model aggregation while using heteroge-
neous quantization. This enables the users to adjust their quantizations proportional to their
transmission rates which can provide a substantial better trade-off between the accuracy
of training and the communication time. In other words, the proposed secure aggregation
schemes allow users with low transmission rates to quantize their model updates by using
low level quantizers so that they could transmit lower number of bits, and allow users
with high transmission rates to choose high level quantizers such that they transmit higher
number of bits. At a high level, the proposed schemes are based on the grouping strategy
by partitioning the network into groups, and partitioning the local model updates of users
into segments. Instead of applying the secure aggregation to the entire local model update
vector, it is applied on segments with specific coordination between users. In these schemes,
we provide a high privacy level for the model updates of the users by preventing the server
1Recently, the authors in [20] propose a new framework that achieves secure Byzantine-robust federated learning without
adapting the existing defenses mechanism.
5from learning a full aggregated model from any subset of users.
• We theoretically evaluate the quantization error for our schemes, and also quantify the
privacy level that each scheme achieves.
• Numerical experiments on the MNIST dataset illustrate the efficiency of the heterogeneous
quantization given by our proposed schemes. Specifically, our experiments show that we can
achieve accuracy close to the case when all users are using a high level quantizer with the
same communication time as the case when all users are using 1-bit quantizer. Moreover,
we demonstrate that we can achieve more than 10× accuracy greater than the setting when
all users are using 1-bit quantizer, while the communication time is the same for all the
settings (our schemes and the 1-bit quantization scheme).
• We show that the grouping strategy used in the proposed schemes results in significant
reduction in the bandwidth expansion of the state-of-the-art secure aggregation protocol
[1]. For instance, we demonstrate that for the case of having N = 214 users using a single
bit quantization, the expansion factor when using the proposed schemes is 4×, as opposite
to 15× when using the state-of-the-art protocol. Achieving reduction of a factor 3.75.
• We also show that the proposed schemes can further enable robustness against Byzantine
users, by incorporating distance-based defense mechanisms such as coordinate-wise median
or coordinate-wise trimmed mean [19] without either extra computation cost at the users
or extra communication cost in the system to the original costs of the secure aggregation
protocol. In other words, the proposed schemes can be used to achieve communication-
efficient secure Byzantine-robust federated learning system. We experimentally validate this
result.
We note that in the distributed optimization literature, there are some algorithms that use
heterogeneous quantization [21]. The authors in [21] provide two heterogeneous quantization
algorithms for fully decentralized machine learning framework to reduce the communication cost,
but there is no any privacy guarantee for the model updates of the users. Our work is different
from [21], since our objective is to provide schemes that not only allow for heterogeneous quan-
tization, but also guarantee the privacy of the users’ models by doing secure model aggregation.
We also consider a network topology where there exists a parameter server. Therefore, the two
setups are not comparable.
6II. SYSTEM MODEL, STATE-OF-THE-ART, CHALLENGES, AND SOLUTION
In this section, we describe the system model, discuss the state-of-the-art protocol of secure
aggregation and explain why it can not be applied directly to our setting, and at the end, we
give a high level discussion of our proposed solutions. Now, we begin with the system model.
A. System Model
We consider a federated learning system that consists of a central server and a set N =
{1, . . . . , N} of N mobile users with different transmission rates that allow training a machine
learning model locally on their private data. In this system, the goal of the server is to learn a
global model parameter vector, θ ∈ Rm, by using the data held at those N distributed mobile
users. This can be done by using the distributed SGD as depicted in Fig. 1. We assume having a
set Q = {QK0 , QK1 , . . . , QKG−1} of G different quantizers that can be used in this system, where
K0 < K1 < · · · < KG−1. The quantization function QKg : [r1, r2] → {r1, r2}, where r1 < r2,
is an element-wise lossy quantization, which represents the mapping of continuous values from
a given range to Kg discrete values within the same range, and Kg ≥ 1 is a tuning parameter
corresponding to the number of quantization levels to be used by the quantizer QKg .
B. Performance Metrics
We will consider two metrics to measure the performance of our proposed schemes. The first
metric is the privacy level δ, and the other metric is the quntization error .
Privacy level δ: When each model update vector xi, for i ∈ N , is equally partitioned into G
segments xi = [x0i ,x
1
i , . . . ,x
G−1
i ]
T , where xli ∈ R
m
G for l = 0, . . . , G− 1, the privacy level δ is
measured by the smallest fraction of segments that the server will not successfully decode from
the aggregated model from any set of users S ⊂ N . In particular, the privacy of the aggregated
model from any set of users S is guaranteed, when the privacy level δ approaches one.
Quantization error  : The quantization error  is given by
 =
1
N2
E[||
∑
i∈N
x¯i −
∑
i∈N
xi||22], (4)
where x¯i is the quantized model update of User i, and ||.||2 is the l2 norm.
7Symbol Description Symbol Description
θ Global model parameter vector yS,i(k) k-th encoded element of the local model update of user i
θi Local model vector of User i U Set of survived users
xi Local model update of User i xU (k) Aggregation of the k-th encoded elements {yS,i(k)}i∈U
m Size of local model update vector Lg Number of subgroups of Group g
N Set of of all users δ Privacy level
N Total number of users  Quantization error
S Subset of users ||.||2 l2 norm
Sg Set of users in Group g B Segment Selection Matrix
QK Quantization function, and K is the levels of quantization ng Number of users in Group g
Q Set of all quantizers in the system Z Total number of subgroups
G Number of quantizers Zg−1 Sum of subgroups of Group 0 to Group g − 1
x¯i(k) k-th quantized element of the local model update of user i 1g=0 An indicator function which gives one when g = 0
TABLE I: Notation used throughout the paper
C. State-of-the-art for Secure Aggregation
We summarize the secure model aggregation protocol [1] in the following five steps while
considering S , N in this discussion. We provide this summary as this protocol is a key
component in our proposed schemes, and to show why it can not be applied directly to the
setting of heterogeneous quantization.
Step 1 (Sharing keys and masks): Users first establish a secure communication channel
between them by using pairwise keys through a key exchange protocol such as Diffie-Hellman
key agreement [22]. All the communication is forwarded through the central server. Also, each
pair of users i, j ∈ N first agrees on a pairwise random seed si,j by using Diffie-Hellman key
agreement, such that si,j is a function of the public key sPKj of user j and the private key s
SK
i
of user i. In addition, user i creates a private random seed bi. The role of bi is to prevent the
privacy breaches that may occur if user i is only delayed instead of dropped (or declared as
dropped by a malicious server), in which case the pairwise masks alone are not sufficient for
privacy protection.
Step 2 (Secret sharing): User i, i ∈ N , secret shares the private key sSKi as well as bi
with the other users in the system, via Shamirs secret sharing [23]. To ensures that the local
model is private against an adversarial server which tries to learn information about the local
models of the honest users, while the mobile users are honest and do not collude with the server,
the threshold of the secret share scheme should be
⌈
N/2
⌉
+ 1. For the case where users-only
adversaries, we can see that no matter how we set the threshold value, users on their own learn
8nothing about other users.
Step 3 (Quantization): Secure aggregation and similar cryptographic protocols require the
input vector elements to be integers, while using modular operation to transmit these vectors.
By considering the case where model update of each user takes real values, we need to do
quantization first so that we can apply the secure aggregation protocol. Without loss of generality,
we use the K-level quantizer in [7] to quantize the model update xi, for i ∈ S. We assume that
the elements of each model xi, for i = 1, . . . , N , fall in the range [r1, r2]. Let 0 ≤ l < Kg be
an integer such that when xi(k) ∈ [B(l), B(l + 1)], where B(l) = r1 + l∆Kg , and ∆Kg = r2−r1Kg−1
is the quantization interval. Then
QKg(xi(k)) =
B(l + 1) with probability
xi(k)−B(l)
B(l+1)−B(l) ,
B(l) otherwise.
(5)
The quantizer in (5) is unbiased as E[QKg( xi(k) )] = xi(k). More generally, the output of the
qunatizer x¯i(k) = QKg(xi(k)) will take a discrete value from this range {r1, r1 + ∆Kg , r1 +
2∆Kg , . . . , r2 −∆Kg , r2}.
Step 4 (Encoding): Following the quantization step, the set of users S starts the encoding
process on {x¯i(k)}i∈S , for k = 1, . . . , |x¯i|, by first mapping the outputs of the quantizer from
the Kg real values that belongs to the discrete range {r1, r1 +∆Kg , r1 +2∆Kg , . . . , r2−∆Kg , r2}
to integer values in this range [0, Kg− 1] such that a real value of r1 maps to 0 and a real value
of r2 maps to Kg − 1, etc. The encoding process is completed by allowing each pair of users
in S to use the pairwise random seeds to randomly generate 0-sum pairs of mask vectors to
provide the privacy for individual models. The output vector of of the encoder is given by
yS,i = x¯i + PRG(bi) +
∑
j:i<j
PRG(si,j)−
∑
j:i>j
PRG(sj,i) mod R, (6)
where yS,i is a vector of |x¯i| elements, and R = |S|(Kg − 1) + 1 to ensure that all possible
aggregate vectors from the |S| users will be representable without overflow at the server. PRG
is a pseudo random generator used to expand the different seeds to vectors in ZR to mask the
local model updates of the users.
Step 5 (Decoding): From a subset of survived users, the server collects either the shares of
private keys the belonging to dropped users, or the shares of the private seed belonging to a
surviving user (but not both). The server then reconstructs the private seed of each surviving user,
and the pairwise seeds si,j of each dropped user i. The server reconstructs si,j by combining the
9reconstructed private key sSKi with the corresponding available public key at the server from user
sPKj . Note that, the server hold all the public keys of all users. The server removes the masks
of the dropped users from the aggregate of the masked models. Finally, the server computes the
aggregated model,
xU =
∑
i∈U
(yS,i − PRG(bi))−
∑
i∈D
(∑
j:i<j
PRG(si,j)−
∑
j:i>j
PRG(sj,i)
)
mod R,
=
∑
i∈U
x¯i mod R, (7)
where U and D represent the set of surviving and dropped users, respectively. The decoding
process is completed by mapping the global model from ZR to the corresponding values in this
discrete set of real numbers {|U|r1, |U|r1 + ∆Kg , |U|r1 + 2∆Kg , . . . , |U|r2 −∆Kg , |U|r2}.
D. Challenges
In this section, we describe why we can not directly use the secure aggregation protocol
directly to the setting of heterogeneous quantization. According to the discussion in the previous
subsection, the key idea in secure aggregation protocol is summarized as follows. Each pair of
users agrees on 0-sum pairs of mask vectors, which are drawn uniformly over the same range
[0, R)m, to mask their model updates, while using the same modulus at both the server side
and the users side as illustrated in Step 4. By working in the space of integers mod R, and by
choosing the masks uniformly over [0, R)m, this guarantee information-theoretic privacy for the
users’ model updates. Correct decoding is guaranteed because the same modulus is used by the
users and the server, and since the mod and summation commute, once all the users updates
are added together at the server side, all the mask pairs will be cancelled out, and the the sum
of users inputs mod R will be represented without any distortion, as we discussed in details
in Step 5. In our problem, users are supposed to use different quantizers in order to transmit
different number of bits proportional to their transmission rates. In fact, allowing users to transmit
different number of bits when using this secure aggregation protocol requires the modulus at
each user to be different. Hence, the size of the finite field of integers which each user works
on to choose its masks at random will also be different. This makes the straightforward usage
of the secure aggregation protocol in the heterogeneous quantization setting is not applicable,
because the masks of users will be drawn from different ranges, and hence we can not have
0-sum pairs of masks, and also different modulus will be used at the users.
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Z1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Z2 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0
Z3 5 4 3 2 1 0 4 3 2 1 0 5
TABLE II: Tuples of masks that users could use in Example 1.
One method to cancel out masks that belongs to different ranges is by using mod D at the
server, where D is an arbitrary integer, and let all users jointly choose a tuple of masks, whose
sum mod D equal to 0, uniformly at random from a set of possible tuples. In this tuple, each mask
for each user belong to its range. The main issue of this approach is that whenever wrapping
around occurs for the transmitted masked model of any user, the masks will not be cancelled
out at the server side and the aggregated model will be distorted. We will consider the following
example for illustration.
Example 1. Assume having three users with the quantized model update vectors x¯1 ∈ [0, 1]m,
x¯2 ∈ [0, 2]m, and x¯3 ∈ [0, 2]m, where m represents the size of the model vector. Without loss
of generality, we assume the masks of User 1, User 2 and User 3 take values randomly over
[0, 1]m, [0, 5]m, and [0, 5]m, respectively. The transmitted masked models from each user and the
sum of the masked models at the server are given as follows
y1 =x¯1 + Z1 mod 2, y2 =x¯2 + Z2 mod 6,
y3 =x¯3 + Z3 mod 6, x{1,2,3} =y1 + y2 + y3 mod 6. (8)
If the users choose their tuple of masks uniformly at random from the set of tuples in Table
II, this makes the mask of each user uniformly distributed over its range, and hence guarantees
user’s model privacy in strong information-theoretic sense. However, the main limitation for
this approach is that there is no any guarantee for correct decoding. In particular, once the
masked models are added together, the masks will not always be canceled out, but it will only
be cancelled out when there is no overflow happens for the transmitted masked model of any
user. In other words, the sum of users models will be distorted whenever an overflow happens
for the transmitted masked model of any user, which occurs with non-negligible probability. For
example, having a tuple of masks (Z1(k), Z2(k), Z3(k)) = (1, 1, 4), while the k-th element of
the model updates of the set of users (x¯1(k), x¯2(k), x¯3(k)) = (1, 0, 0), an overflow will occur at
User 1, y1 = 0, and the sum will be x{1,2,3}(k) = 5 instead of being x{1,2,3}(k) = 1.
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One way to use the secure aggregation protocol in our heterogeneous setting is to use the
multi-group structure. This is done by partitioning the network into G groups, where the set
of users Sg, for g = 0, . . . , G − 1, uses the same level quantizer QKg which is proportional to
the transmission rate of its users, and then applying the five steps of secure aggregation to each
group. However, in this strategy the server would learn the aggregate of the model updates from
each group, i.e., the privacy level δ = 0, which implies knowing the average model from each
group. Hence, this strategy is not robust against some attacks such as Membership Inference
Attack [24], [25]. In this attack, the server could breach the privacy of users by inferring whether
a specific data point was used in the training by a certain subset of users or not by observing
the average model from this set of users. By letting the server observe the average model from
small group, the attack becomes much stronger, because the inferred information may directly
reveal the identity of the users to whom the data belongs.
E. Solutions
At a high level, we propose three schemes called the Single Chain (SC) scheme, the Multiple
Chains (MC) scheme and the Hybrid Chain (HC) scheme which allow for secure model aggre-
gation with heterogeneous quantization. The three schemes are based on the grouping strategy,
but instead of executing the secure aggregation protocol on the entire local model update vector,
we execute it on segments with a specific coordination between the users as we will discuss in
Section III. In these schemes, the privacy level does not equal to zero, δ 6= 0, i.e., the server
would not learn the full aggregate model from any subset of users. The three schemes are the
same in terms of providing privacy for users’ individual models, while they are difference in the
privacy level δ and the quantization error . More specifically, the SC scheme is better than the
MC scheme in reducing the quantization error, while the MC scheme provides a higher privacy
level. The privacy level that the MC scheme achieves is given by δ = G−2
G
, i.e., the server will
not successfully decode more than 2 segments from the aggregated model update from any set
of users S ⊂ N . Hence, for the case of having a number of groups G equals to the size of the
model update m, the server will successfully decode only 2
m
of the average model from any
set of users which approaches 0 when the model size is sufficiently large. In other words, for
sufficiently large number of groups G and model size m, the privacy level of the MC scheme
approaches one, and the privacy of the average model of any set of users S ⊂ N is guaranteed.
Finally, the HC scheme is a combination between the SC scheme and the MC scheme, which
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gives the flexibility to make a trade-off between the privacy level δ and the quantization error
 when designing the FL system. Note that, we discuss how our schemes can be utilized to
overcome Byzantine users in Section V-A, and experimentally validate that in Section VI-C. We
also show how the bandwidth expansion can be reduced by using the strategy of the proposed
schemes in Section VI-A.
III. THE PROPOSED SECURE AGGREGATION SCHEMES
In this section, we present the SC scheme, the MC scheme and the HC scheme, and illustrate
each scheme through an example.
The following procedure is the same for the three schemes. First, the set of N users applies
Step 1 of the secure aggregation protocol given in Section II-C to share keys and masks. Each
user then uses Step 2 to secret share its masks with the other users in the system. After that,
the set of N users are clustered into G groups, where the set of users in Group g is denoted by
Sg, and each group has the same number of users, |Sg| = NG = n, for g = 0, . . . , G − 1. The
case of having a different number of users in each group is presented in Section V. We note that
the grouping of users is based on their transmission rates such that users in higher groups have
a transmission rate higher than users in lower groups. Following the clustering step, each local
model update vector {xi}i∈[N ] is equally partitioned into G segments xi = [x0i ,x1i , . . . ,xG−1i ]T ,
where xli ∈ R
m
G for l = 0, . . . , G − 1. Also, we can see the aggregated model update at the
server xS , where S ⊆ N , as a set of G segments xS = [x0S ,x1S , . . . ,xG−1S ]T . Finally, instead
of making all the N users execute the secure aggregation protocol together on the set of whole
vectors {xi}i∈N , we let different sets of users execute it on different sets of segments.
Each set of segments and its corresponding set of users that jointly execute the secure
aggregation together can be obtained by using the G×G Segment Selection (SS) matrix B. In
this matrix, each column represents a set of users Sg, for g = 0, . . . , G − 1, and each row l,
where l = 0, . . . , G− 1, represents the index of the segment. Several examples on the SS matrix
can be found in the following subsections. In the SS matrix, having an entry B(l, g) = ∗ means
that the set of users S = Sg will execute the secure aggregation protocol on the set of segments
{xli}i∈Sg . In other words, having B(l, g) = ∗ means that the set of users S = Sg will quantize
the set of segments {xli}i∈Sg according to Step 3 in Section II-C by using the quantizer QKg ,
and jointly encode the quantized segments together according to Step 4. At the server side, these
set of segments will be decoded together. In the SS matrix, when B(l, g) = B(l, g′), this means
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that the set of users S = Sg ∪ Sg′ corresponding to these columns g and g′, where g < g′, will
quantize the set of segments {xli}i∈Sg∪Sg′ by using the quantizer QKg and jointly encode the
quantized segments, while at the server side, these set of segments will be decoded together.
Finally, the server aggregates each set of decoded segments xlS , which results from different sets
of users and belong to the same segment level, l, together. The server concatenates these sets of
aggregated segments, which belong to these levels l ∈ [0, G− 1], to get the global update x.
The difference between the three schemes is on the design of the SS matrix. Now, we give
the algorithm used to generate the SS matrix for each scheme along with an example.
A. Single Chain Scheme (SC)
The SS matrix for the SC scheme is designed by using Algorithm 1. Now, we demonstrate
the execution of the SC scheme through an illustrative example.
Example 2. Assume having a set of N users, and a set of G = 5 quantizers Q = {QK0 , QK1 ,
QK2 , QK3 , QK4} that can be used in the system, where K0 < · · · < K4. The SC scheme is
started by letting the N users first share their keys and masks with each other, and then each
user secret shares its masks with the other users in the system. After that, users are clustered into
G = 5 groups with n users in each group, where groups are arranged in ascending order based
on the transmission rates of their users. The local model of each user, xi for i ∈ [N ], is equally
partitioned into G = 5 segments xi = [x0i ,x
1
i ,x
2
i ,x
3
i ,x
4
i ]
T , where xli ∈ R
m
5 , for l = 0, . . . , 4. The
SS matrix BSC that is used for managing the execution of the SC secure aggregation scheme
is given on the right-hand side of Algorithm 1, where the label for each column represents the
index of the group (index g of the set of users Sg), and the label of each row represents the
index l of the segment xli.
Algorithm 1: Segment Selection matrix BSC for the SC scheme
for g = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
BSC(g, g) = BSC(g, g + 1 mod G) = g mod (G− 1);
end
The remaining entries of matrix BSC will hold ∗
BSC =
0 1 2 3 4

0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ 1 1 ∗ ∗ 1
∗ ∗ 2 2 ∗ 2
∗ ∗ ∗ 3 3 3
0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 4
To simplify the illustration of this example, the set of segments that will be executed by the
secure aggregation protocol together is given the same color as illustrated in Fig. 2. In particular,
the set of segments {x0i }i∈S0∪S1 will be quantized by the quantizer QK0 according to the third
step in Section II-C. By using the encoding step in Section II-C, the output of the quantizer
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Fig. 2: Network topology with N users partitioned into G = 5 groups, with n users in each
group. Each user holds a quantized local model update vector x¯i, i ∈ [N ]. The segment selection
and grouping is completed by using the SC scheme.
{x¯0i }i∈S , where S = S0 ∪ S1, will be first mapped from the values that belongs to its discrete
range to integer values in this range [0, K0−1]. By generating the random 0-sum pairs of masks
and the individual masks, the encoded segment for each user i ∈ S will be given as follows
y0S,i = x¯
0
i + PRG(bi) +
∑
j:i<j
PRG(si,j)−
∑
j:i>j
PRG(sj,i) mod R, (9)
where R = |S|(K0−1) + 1, |S| = 2n, and j ∈ S, while the PRG is used to expand the different
seeds to segments in ZR. The server collects the shares and reconstructs the private seed of each
surviving user, and the pairwise seeds of each dropped user, to be removed from the aggregate
of the masked models. The server then computes the aggregated model segment,
x0U =
∑
i∈U
(y0S,i − PRG(bi))−
∑
i∈D
(∑
j:i<j
PRG(si,j)−
∑
j:i>j
PRG(sj,i)
)
mod R,
=
∑
i∈U0
x¯0i +
∑
i∈U1
x¯0i mod R. (10)
The set Ui represents the set of survived users from Si, for i = 0, 1. The aggregate model update
from Group 0 after fully unmasking its users’ models is given by Table III-A, where Ug ⊆ Sg
for g = 0, . . . , 4, represents the set of survived users from Group g. According to Table III-A,
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x0U0∪U1 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
0
i +
∑
i∈U1 x¯
0
i
x1U0 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
1
i
x2U0 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
2
i
x3U0 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
3
i
x4U0∪U4 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
4
i +
∑
i∈U4 x¯
4
i
TABLE III-A: By using the SC scheme.
x0U0∪U1 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
0
i +
∑
i∈U1 x¯
0
i
x1U0∪U2 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
1
i +
∑
i∈U2 x¯
1
i
x2U0∪U3 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
2
i +
∑
i∈U3 x¯
2
i
x3U0∪U4 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
3
i +
∑
i∈U4 x¯
3
i
x4U0 =
∑
i∈U0 x¯
4
i
TABLE III-B: By using the MC scheme.
TABLE III: The aggregated model of Group 0 after unmasking the model updates of its users.
the server will only learn the second, the third and the fourth segment of the aggregated model
update from Group 0, while the other segments from that group will involve segments from some
other groups. In general, the server will know the three segments corresponding to the indices
denoted by ∗ in the SS matrix BSC from each individual group out of its five segments. Also,
the server will not learn more than 0.6 from any set of users S ⊂ N , and hence the privacy
level will be δSC = 0.4.
B. Multiple Chains Scheme (MC)
The SS matrix for the MC scheme is designed by using Algorithm 2.
Example 3. Instead of applying the SC scheme on Example 2, we apply the MC scheme. The
SS matrix BMC for this scheme is given on the right-hand side of Algorithm 2. By applying the
secure aggregation protocol given in Section II-C based on the SS matrix BMC, the aggregate
model update from Group 0 after fully unmasking their users’ models updates is given by Table
III-B. From this group, the server will learn only the last segment of its aggregated model update.
More generally, the server will only know one segment from each individual group which is
corresponding to the index denoted by ∗ in the SS matrix BMC. Also, it can be easily seen that
the server will not learn more than 0.2 of the segments from the aggregate model update from
any set of users S ⊂ N , and hence the privacy level will be δMC = 0.8.
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Algorithm 2: Segment Selection matrix BMC for the MC scheme
for g = 0, . . . , G− 2 do
for r = 0, . . . , G− g − 2 do
l = 2g + r;
BMC(l mod G, g) = BMC(l mod G, g + r + 1) = g;
end
end
The remaining entries of matrix BMC will hold ∗.
BMC =
0 1 2 3 4

0 0 2 ∗ 2 0
0 ∗ 0 3 3 1
0 1 1 0 ∗ 2
0 1 ∗ 1 0 3
∗ 1 2 2 1 4
.
.
C. Hybrid Chain Scheme
The HC scheme is a combination between the SC scheme and the MC scheme. This scheme
gives the flexibility to make a trade-off between the privacy level δ and the quantization error
 when designing the FL system. The design of the SS matrix is given by Algorithm 3, which
starts by first selecting a threshold value T (design parameter), where 2 ≤ T ≤ G − 2, on
the maximum number of segments the server could learn from the aggregated model of one
group. After that, matrix BHC is designed by first applying Algorithm 2 of the MC scheme for
g = 0, . . . , g
T
− 1, where g
T
= G− T − 1, and from Group g = g
T
, . . . , G− 1, we start using
Algorithm 1 of the SC scheme.
Example 4. We apply the HC scheme on Example 2, while assuming that T = 2, and hence
g
T
= 2. The SS matrix BHC for this scheme is given on the right-hand side of Algorithm
3. According to matrix BHC, the privacy level for this example is δHC = 0.6. As before, the
segments that the server will learn from each individual group are corresponding to the indices
denoted by ∗ in the SS matrix BHC. Also, from more than two groups the server will learn no
more than 2 segments.
Remark 1. The MC scheme achieves the highest privacy level among the the three schemes
evaluated by the examples in this section with δ = 0.8, while the SC scheme achieves the lowest
privacy with δ = 0.4. Finally, the HC scheme was designed to give a privacy level δ = 0.6.
In the following section, we will give the general results for each scheme and show that for
sufficiently large G, the privacy level of the MC and the HC approaches 1.
Note that, users could generate the SS matrix of each scheme by just knowing the users in
each group and the order of the groups.
17
IV. THEORETICAL GUARANTEES OF THE PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we state our main results for the theoretical performance guarantees of the
three proposed schemes. Our first result is on the privacy level, while the second one is on the
quantization error.
Algorithm 3: Segment Selection matrix BHC for the HC scheme
for g = 0, . . . , G− 2 do
if g < g
T
then
for r = 0, . . . , G− g − 2 do
l = 2g + r;
BHC(l mod G, g) = BHC(l mod G, g + r + 1) = g;
end
else
BHC((gT + g) mod G, g) = BHC((gT + g) mod G, g + 1) = g
end
end
The remaining entries of matrix BHC will hold ∗.
BHC =
0 1 2 3 4

0 0 ∗ 3 3 0
0 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ 1
0 1 1 0 ∗ 2
0 1 ∗ 1 0 3
∗ 1 2 2 1 4
.
.
A. privacy level
We characterize the privacy level of the three proposed schemes in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. For a federated learning system that consists of a central server, a set of N users
with different transmission rates, and a set Q of G different quantizers, the privacy level achieved
by each scheme is given by:
(i) The SC scheme achieves a privacy level of δSC = 2G .
(ii) The MC scheme achieves a privacy level of δMC = G−2G when the number of groups is
even, and δMC = G−1G when the number of groups is odd.
(iii) The HC scheme achieves a privacy level of δHC = G−TG , for 2 ≤ T ≤ G− 2, where T is
the threshold value on the maximum number of segments the server could learn from the
aggregated model of one group.
Proof 1-(i). The proof follows easily from the design of the SS matrix BSC generated by using
Algorithm 1. In this matrix, the number of segments of the aggregated model updates xS , where
S = Sg, that the server will learn from Group g, for g = 0, . . . , G− 1, is G− 2 segments. This
is also the largest number of segments the server could learn from any set of users S ⊂ N . The
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former result follows thanks to the chain design of the matrix BSC, which given by Algorithm
1. Hence, the privacy level is given δSC = 2G . 
Proof 1-(ii). According to the chain design of the SS matrix BMC generated by using Algorithm
2, the server will learn in general only one segment from the aggregated model of any individual
group. This is also the largest number of segments the server could learn from any set of users
S ⊂ N , when the number of groups is odd. For the case when the number of groups G is even,
the server will learn no more than two segments from the aggregated model update from any
set of users S ⊂ N . These two segments that the server will learn result from the aggregated
model from each pair of groups (g, g + G
2
), for g < G
2
. The two segments from the aggregated
model of each pair of groups are given as follows: One segment resulted by the joint execution
of the secure aggregation protocol by the set of users in these pair of groups. The other segment
is the sum of two sets of segments, which executed separately by their corresponding users in
each group in that pair of groups. 
To further illustrate Theorem 1-(ii), when number of groups, G, is even, we consider the
following 6 × 6 SS matrix BMC. Note that, we have already given an example for the case of
odd number of groups in Example 3. According to this matrix, the server will learn the third
segment from the aggregated model of the pair of groups (0, 3). Also, the server will learn the
sum of the last segments of the aggregated model from Group 0 and Group 3. This means that
the server will learn two segments, which are the third and the last segment, out of six segments
from the aggregated model of the pair of groups (0, 3). Hence, the privacy level will be δ = 2/3.
BMC =

0 0 2 3 3 2
0 ∗ 0 3 ∗ 3
0 1 1 0 4 4
0 1 ∗ 1 0 ∗
0 1 2 2 1 0
∗ 1 2 ∗ 2 1

.
Proof 1-(iii). According to the SS matrix BHC generated by using Algorithm 3, the server will
learn one segment from the aggregate model update of Group g, for 0 ≤ g ≤ g
T
− 1 where
g
T
= G−T−1, T−1 segments from Group g, for g
T
< g ≤ G−2, and T segments from Group
g
T
and Group G− 1. From any set of groups the server will not learn more than T segments.
This implies a privacy level δHC = G−TG . 
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Remark 2. Theorem 1 quantifies the privacy level of each scheme, and we can see that the
MC scheme increases the privacy level from δSC = 2G to δMC =
G−2
G
when G is even, or to
δMC =
G−1
G
when G is odd. When the number of groups G = m, where m is the model size, the
MC scheme achieves the highest privacy level, and the fraction of segments that the server will
learn from the average model from any set of users becomes 2
m
(or 1
m
when G is odd), which
approaches zero for sufficiently large model size. In other words, for sufficiently large m and G,
the privacy of the aggregated model from any set of users S ⊂ N is guaranteed (δ approaches
one). Finally, the privacy level of the HC scheme is designed based on the threshold value T ,
which belongs to this range 2 ≤ T ≤ G − 2. We can see that the smaller the T , the higher
privacy we can achieve. We will see later that T also affects the quantization error. In other
words, the threshold value T makes a trade-off between the privacy level and the quantization
error.
B. Quantization Error
Now, we characterize the quantization error of each scheme by first providing a general bound
on the quantization error, and after that we use this bound to characterize the quantization error
for each scheme.
Theorem 2. For a federated learning system that consists of a central server, a set of N users,
where each user has a model update vector xi ∈ Rm, such that the elements of each model update
xi, for i = 1, . . . , N , fall in the range [r1, r2], and each model update vector is partitioned into
G equal segments, the quantization error resulted from using the set Q of G different stochastic
quantizers given in Step 3 in Section II-C is bounded by
 ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
G
N∑
i=1
G−1∑
l=0
1
(Kil − 1)2
, (11)
where Kil is the level of quantizer that used to quantize the l-th segment of the model update xi.
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix A. We use this result to compute the
quantization error bound for each scheme in the following corollaries.
Corollary 2.1. The quantization error of the SC scheme is bounded by
SC ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
G
n
(
G+ 2
(K0 − 1)2 +
G− 2
(KG−1 − 1)2 +
G−2∑
g=1
G
(Kg − 1)2
)
, (12)
20
where n is the number of users in each group.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. According to matrix BSC, each User i ∈ Sg, for 0 < g < G − 1 uses
quantizer QKg to quantize G− 1 segments of its model update vector, and uses quantizer QKg−1
to quantize the remaining segment. The set of users in S0 uses quantizer QK0 to quantize all
the G segments of their vectors. Finally, the set of users SG−1 uses QKG−1 to quantize G − 2
segments, and uses QKG−2 and QK0 for the remaining two segments of their local model updates.
Hence, the total number of segments uses quantizer QKg , where 0 < g < G − 1, is nG, while
for QK0 and QKG−1 are (G+ 2)n segments and (G− 2)n segments, respectively. 
Corollary 2.2. The quantization error of the MC scheme is bounded by
MC ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
G
n
G−1∑
g=0
2(G− g)− 1
(Kg − 1)2 . (13)
Proof of Corollary 2.2. According to the SS matrix BMC, each user i ∈ Sg in Group g, for
0 ≤ g ≤ G−1 will use quantizer QKg to quantize G−g segments, and the remaining g segments
will be quantized by the set of quantizers {QK0 , QK1 , . . . , QKg−1}, with one segment for each
quantizer. Hecne, the total number of segments used quantizer QKg , where 0 ≤ g ≤ G − 1, is
given by (2(G− g)− 1)n. 
Corollary 2.3. The quantization error of the HC scheme is bounded by
HC ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
G
n
 T + 2
(Kg
T
− 1)2 +
T
(KG−1 − 1)2 +
g
T
−1∑
g=0
2(G− g)− 1
(Kg − 1)2 +
G−2∑
g=g
T
+1
T + 1
(Kg − 1)2
 .
(14)
Proof of Corollary 2.3. According to the SS matrix BHC, the total number of segments used
quantizer QKg is (2(G− g)− 1)n for 0 ≤ g ≤ gT − 1, n(T + 1) for gT < g ≤ G− 2, n(T + 2)
for g = g
T
, finally nT , for g = G− 1. 
Remark 3. The previous corollaries give the quantization error bound of each scheme, and
as we can see that the SC scheme has a smaller quantization error than the MC scheme. The
reason for that, in the MC scheme quantizers with high levels are used fewer than quantizers
with lower levels, while in the SC scheme, almost all the quantizers are used equally. For the
HC scheme, we can see that T determines its quantization error as we discussed in Remark 2.
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Remark 4. From the theorems and the corollaries given in this section, we can see that the
SC scheme is better than the MC scheme in terms of reducing the quantization error, while the
MC scheme provides a higher privacy level. The HC scheme is a combination between the SC
scheme and the MC scheme, which gives the flexibility to make a trade-off between the privacy
level δ and the quantization error  based on the threshold value T when designing the FL
system.
V. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST BYZANTINE USERS AND EXTENSIONS TO HETEROGENEOUS
NETWORK
In this section we show how our proposed schemes can be utilized to mitigate Byzantine
users. After that, we extend our proposed schemes to heterogeneous network.
A. Robustness against Byzantine users
The design of the SS matrices of the three schemes given by Algorithms 1, 2, and 3, enable
the implementation of some defense techniques such as coordinate-wise median or coordinate-
wise trimmed mean [19] against Byzantine users2. This is because the design of the SS matrices
allows the server to see G different sets of unmasked segments, where the unmasked segments
in each set belong to the same level (have the same index l). Each unmasked segment in any
given set is from the aggregated model updates of different sets of users. This is difference than
the design of the other secure aggregation protocols which make the server see only the masked
models of users and the aggregate of all users model updates. To further illustrate this point, we
consider the the SS matrix BMC given in Example 3. In this matrix and according to its first row,
the server will see this set of unmasked segments {x0S0∪S1 = 12n(
∑
i∈S0 x¯
0
i +
∑
i∈S1 x¯
0
i ), x
0
S2∪S4 =
1
2n
(
∑
i∈S2 x¯
0
i +
∑
i∈S4 x¯
0
i ), x
0
S3 =
1
n
∑
i∈S3 x¯
0
i }, which belongs to the same level l = 0, from the
average model update from the sets of users in this tuple of sets (S0∪S1,S2∪S4,S3), respectively.
Since we have more than one segment in each set, coordinate-wise median or coordinate-wise
trimmed mean [19] can be applied on each set of segments.
The coordinate-wise median scheme in [19] is presented for the case where the fraction of
Byzantine users is less than half the number of users, i.e., the number of good models is more
than the number of bad models. To find the number of allowed Byzantine users in our setting
2Byzantine users are some users that may behave completely arbitrarily and can send any message to the server [26].
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while using our proposed strategy, we focus on the MC scheme as it provides the highest privacy
level among the proposed schemes. We consider the worst case scenario where Byzantine users
are distributed uniformly among the groups. To make sure that each set of segments, which
belongs to the same level l, will contain good segments more than bad segments, the number
of Byzantine users, nB, should be nB ≤ 0.25G − 1. The former result comes from the fact
that having one Byzantine user in one group will make all the segments of the average model
from this group bad. Also in the MC scheme, we can see that some segments belong to the
aggregated model from two groups. This means that one Byzantine user in one group can affect
one segment in another group. Note that, the number of allowed Byzantine users can be further
increased with increasing the number of groups. We experimentally validate this result in Section
VI-C.
B. The Proposed Schemes for Heterogeneous Network
So far, we have considered the homogeneous case in our proposed schemes where clustering
users results in the same number of users in each group. In this section, we consider a hetero-
geneous setting where instead of assuming that the set of N users are divided equally on the G
groups where each group has n users, we assume the case where the number of users in each
group is different. The reason for that the grouping step of users is based on their transmission
rates, and hence we might have some groups with more users than others. Now, we extend the
proposed schemes to the heterogeneous network. Then, we provide their theoretical guarantees.
The following procedure is the same for the three schemes. First the set of N users are
clustered into G groups, where the set of users in Group g is denoted by Sg and |Sg| = ng, for
g = 0, . . . , G − 1, where ∑Gg=1 ng = N . We also assume having a set Q of G quantizers. The
second extension for the proposed schemes is that we allow further partitioning of the groups
into smaller subgroups when the number of users in each group is large. Having a large number
of users at groups happens when the number of quantizers G to be used in the system is small,
while the number of users N is large. Further partitioning results in decreasing the expansion
factor which will be discussed in details in Section VI. Also, this results in improving the privacy
level of the MC scheme while giving more flexibility on the choice of the threshold value T of
the HC scheme. In particular, we partition each set of users Sg, for g = 0, . . . , G − 1, into Lg
subsets (subgroups), Sdg , for d = 0, . . . , Lg − 1, such that each subgroup has the same number
of users n¯. The number of users that jointly executes the secure aggregation protocol together
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is either n¯ or 2n¯ and hence makes the different in the number of the transmitted bits from
each user depends only on the level of the quantizer. Furthermore, each model update vector
{xi}i∈[N ] is equally partitioned into Z segments xi = [x0i ,x1i , . . . ,xZ−1i ]T , where xli ∈ R
m
Z and
Z =
∑G−1
g=0 Lg, for l = 0, . . . , Z − 1. Also, we should have Z ≤ m, and for sufficiently large
N > m, we might restrict the number of subgroups to equal the size of the model parameter
Z = m, which means that each segment of the local model update is just one element. We
define Zg−1 =
∑g−1
l=0 Ll, to represent the sum of subgroups of Group 0 to Group g − 1, such
that Zg−1 = 0 when g = 0.
As before, the three schemes are different in the design of the SS matrix. The SS matrix in
this section is denoted by Be with dimensions Z ×Z, such that each column is indexed by two
indices (g, d) and represents the set of users Sdg , for g = 0, . . . , G−1 and d = 0, . . . , Lg−1, while
each row l, for l = 0, . . . , Z − 1, represents the index of the segment. Similar to the description
in Section III, having an entry Be(l, (g, d)) = ∗ means that the the set of users S = Sdg will
quantize the set of segments {xli}i∈Sdg by the quantizer QKg and encode them together, while at
the server side these set of segment will be decoded together. When Be(l, (g, d)) = Be(l, (g′, d′)),
where g ≤ g′, this means that the set of users S = Sdg ∪ Sd′g′ , corresponding to these columns
(g, d) and (g′, d′), will quantize the set of segments {xli}i∈Sdg∪Sd′g′ by using the quantizer QKg ,
and encode the output of the quantizer together, while at the server side these set of segments
will be decoded together.
Algorithm 4: Segment Selection matrix BeSC+ for the SC+ scheme
Define: Zg−1 =
∑g−1
l=0 Ll and Zg−1 = 0 when g = 0;
for g = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
for d = 0, . . . , Lg − 1 do
if (g, d) 6= (G− 1, Lg − 1) then
if d 6= Lg − 1 then
BeSC+(Zg−1 + d, (g, d)) = B
e
SC(Zg−1 + d, (g, d+ 1)) = (g, d)
else
BeSC+(Zg−1 + d, (g, d)) = B
e
SC(Zg−1 + d, (g + 1, 0)) = (g, d)
end
else
BeSC+(Z − 1, (0, 0)) = BeSC(Z − 1, (G− 1, LG − 1)) = (g, d)
end
end
end
The remaining entries of Matrix BeSC will hold ∗.
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1) Single Chain+ (SC+) scheme : The SS matrix for the SC+ scheme is designed by using
Algorithm 4. Now, we give an example for this SS matrix.
Example 5. Assume having N = 15 users and a set of G = 3 quantizers. According to the
transmission rates of the users, we assume having n0 = 3, n1 = 6 and n2 = 6 users in Group
0, Group 1 and Group 2, respectively. We further partition the groups into L0 = 1, L1 = 2, and
L2 = 2 subgroups, respectively. The number of users in each subgroup is given by n¯ = 3. The
matrix BeSC+ in (15) represents the SS matrix for this example, where the pair of labels (g, d),
for g = 0, 1, 2 and d = 0, . . . , Lg − 1, for each column represents the index of the subgroup
(index of the set of users Sdg ), and the label of each row represents the index of the segment.
According to this SS matrix BeSC+, the server will learn 0.6 of the segments from the aggregate
model update from each individual group, and the privacy level is given by δSC+ = 0.4.
2) Multiple Chains+ (MC+) scheme : The SS matrix for the MC+ scheme is designed by
using Algorithm 5. The matrix BeMC+ in (15) represents the case of having G = 3 with number
of subgroups in each group L0 = 1, L1 = 2, and L2 = 2. For this SS matrix, the server will learn
0.2 of the segments from the aggregate model update from each individual group and no more
than that from any subset of users in general, and hence the privacy level will be δMC+ = 0.8.
3) Hybrid Chain+ (HC+) scheme : As before, the Hybrid Chain+ scheme is a combination
between the SC+ scheme and the MC+ scheme. The design of the SS matrix is given by
Algorithm 6, which starts by first selecting a threshold value T on the maximum number of
segments the server could learn from the aggregated model of one subgroup, where 2 ≤ T ≤
Z − 2. Let z
T
= Z − T − 1, and for z
T
∈ [Zg
T
−1, Zg
T
− 1], the SS matrix BeHC+ is designed
by first applying Algorithm 6 of the MC+ scheme for 0 ≤ (g, d) < (g
T
, d
T
), where d
T
= z
T
mod Zg
T
−1, and for (gT , dT ) ≤ (g, d) ≤ (G− 1, d− 1), we start using Algorithm 4 of the SC+
scheme. Note that, we use pair-wise comparison, e.g., having two pairs (2, 0) and (1, 3), this
means that (2, 0) > (1, 3). The SS matrix BeHC+ for Example 5 when applying the HC+ is given
in (15). For this example, we have T = 2, and hence (g
T
, d
T
) = (1, 1). The segments that the
server will learn from each individual group are corresponding to the indices denoted by ∗ in
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the SS matrix BeHC+. This results in a privacy level δHC+ = 0.6.
Algorithm 5: Segment Selection matrix BeMC+ for the MC+ scheme
Define: Zg−1 =
∑g−1
l=0 Ll and Zg−1 = 0 when g = 0, and 1 is the indicator function;
for g = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
for d = 0, . . . , Lg − 1− 1g=G−1 do
i = 0 and s = 0 ;
for r = 0, . . . , Z − Zg−1 − d− 2 do
m = 2(Zg−1 + d) + r ;
if (d+ r + 1) mod
∑i
l=0 Lg+l = 0 then
i = i+ 1 and s = 0 ;
BeMC+((m mod Z, (g, d)) = B
e
MC(m mod Z, ( (g + i), s)) = (g, d)
else
s = s+ 1 ;
BeMC+((m mod Z, (g, d)) = B
e
MC(m mod Z, ( (g + i), s)) = (g, d)
end
end
end
end
The remaining entries of Matrix BeMC will hold ∗
BeSC+ =
(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1) (2, 0) (2, 1)

(0, 0) (0, 0) ∗ ∗ ∗ 0
∗ (1, 0) (1, 0) ∗ ∗ 1
∗ ∗ (1, 1) (1, 1) ∗ 2
∗ ∗ ∗ (2, 0) (2, 0) 3
(0, 0) ∗ ∗ ∗ (0, 0) 4
.
BeMC+ =
(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1) (2, 0) (2, 1)

(0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 1) ∗ (1, 1) 0
(0, 0) ∗ (0, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) 1
(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 0) ∗ 2
(0, 0) (1, 0) ∗ (1, 0) (0, 0) 3
∗ (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) 4
BeHC+ =
(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 1) (2, 0) (2, 1)

(0, 0) (0, 0) ∗ (2, 0) (2, 0) 0
(0, 0) ∗ (0, 0) ∗ ∗ 1
(0, 0) (1, 0) (1, 0) (0, 0) ∗ 2
(0, 0) (1, 0) ∗ (1, 0) (0, 0) 3
∗ (1, 0) (1, 1) (1, 1) (1, 0) 4
(15)
C. Theoretical Guarantees of the Proposed Schemes for Heterogeneous Network
As before, we state our main results for the theoretical performance guarantees of the extended
version of the proposed schemes. Our first result is on the privacy level, while the second one
is on the quantization error.
1) privacy level: We characterize the privacy level of the SC+ scheme, the MC+ scheme,
and the HC+ scheme in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. For a federated learning system that consists of a central server, a set of N users
with different transmission rates, and a set Q of G different quantizers, the privacy level achieved
by each scheme is given by:
(i) The SC+ scheme achieves a privacy level of δMC+ = 2Z .
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Algorithm 6: Segment Selection matrix BeHC+ for the HC+ scheme
Define: Zg−1 =
∑g−1
l=0 Ll and Zg−1 = 0 when g = 0, and 1 is the indicator function;
for g = 0, . . . , G− 1 do
for d = 0, . . . , Lg − 1− 1g=G−1 do
if (g, d) < (gT , dT ) then
i = 0 and s = 0;
for r = 0, . . . , Z − Zg−1 − d− 2 do
m = 2(Zg−1 + d) + r ;
if (d+ r + 1) mod
∑i
l=0 Lg+l = 0 then
i = i+ 1 and s = 0 ;
BeHC+((m mod Z, (g, d)) = B
e
HC+(m mod Z, ( (g + i), s)) = (g, d)
else
s = s+ 1;
BeHC+((m mod Z, (g, d)) = B
e
HC+(m mod Z, ( (g + i), s)) = (g, d)
end
end
else
if d 6= Lg − 1 then
BeHC+((ZgT −1 + Zg−1 + d+ dT )
mod Z, (g, d)) = BeHC+(ZgT −1 + Zg−1 + d+ d, (g, d+ 1)) = (g, d)
else
BeHC+((ZgT −1 + Zg−1 + d+ dT ) mod Z, (g, d)) = B
e
HC+((ZgT −1 + Zg−1 + d+ dT )
mod Z, (g + 1, 0)) = (g, d)
end
end
end
end
The remaining entries of Matrix BeHC will hold ∗.
(ii) The MC+ scheme achieves a privacy level of δMC+ = Z−2Z , when the number of subgroups
is even, and δMC+ = Z−1Z , when the number of subgroups is odd.
(iii) The HC scheme achieves a privacy level of δHC+ = Z−TZ ., where 2 ≤ T ≤ Z − 2, is
the threshold value on the maximum number of segments the server could learn from the
aggregated model of one subgroup.
We omitted the proofs of the previous theorem, as it follows easily from the design of the SS
matrix of each scheme, and can be derived similarly to Theorem 1.
2) Quantization error: The main theorem for the quantization error in this section is the same
as the one in Theorem 4, with replacing G with Z, where Z is the total number of subgroups.
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Note that, the description of the symbols in the following corollaries is included in Table I.
Corollary 2.4. The quantization error of the SC+ scheme is bounded by
SC+ ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
Z
n¯
(
ZL0 + 2
(K0 − 1)2 +
ZLG−1 − 2
(KG−1 − 1)2 +
G−2∑
g=1
ZLg
(Kg − 1)2
)
, (16)
where n¯ is the number of users in each subgroup, and Lg is the number of subgroups in Group
g.
Corollary 2.5. The quantization error of the MC+ scheme is bounded by
MC+ ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
Z
n¯
G−1∑
g=0
∑Lg−1
j=0 (2(Z − Zg−1 − j)− 1)
(Kg − 1)2 . (17)
Corollary 2.6. The quantization error of the HC+ scheme is bounded by
HC+ ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
Z
n¯
(
(LG−1 − 1)(T + 1) + T
(KG−1 − 1)2 +
G−2∑
g=g
T
+1
Lg(T + 1)
(Kg − 1)2 +
g
T
−1∑
g=0
∑Lg−1
j=0 (2(Z − Zg−1 − j)− 1)
(Kg − 1)2
+
1d
T
6=0
∑d
T
−1
j=0 (2(Z − ZgT−1 − j)− 1) + (T + 2) + (LgT − dT − 2)(T + 1) + (T + 1gT 6=G−1)
(Kg
T
− 1)2
)
, (18)
where T is the design parameter of the HC+ scheme, d
T
and g
T
are already defined in the HC+
scheme, and 1g
T
6=G−1 is the indicator function which gives 1 when gT 6= G− 1, otherwise 0.
The proofs of these corollaries follow directly from the SS matrix for each scheme and can
be evaluated as in Section IV by counting the segments that each quantizer will quantize.
VI. COMPLEXITY, ROBUSTNESS TO USER DROPOUT, AND NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we study the overall complexity of the proposed schemes, the robustness to
user dropout, and at the end we give some numerical experiments.
A. Overall Complexity of the Proposed Schemes
The overall complexity of the proposed schemes can be broken to two parts, computation
complexity and communication complexity. Now, we discuss each of them separately.
User computation complexity: O(N2 + n¯m). Each user computation can be broken up as (1)
Performing the 2N key agreements, which takes O(N) time, (2) Creating t-out-of-N Shamir
secret shares of the private key of sSKi and the bi, which is order O(N2) (3) Generating the
model masks to mask every entry in the model update vector according to Equation (6) for all
neighbors which takes O(n¯m) time in total. The former result comes from the fact that each
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element in the proposed schemes is masked by either n¯− 1 masks or 2n¯− 1 masks, unlike the
secure aggregation protocol [1] where the whole vector is masked by N − 1 masks. Hence, for
the case where the number of users in each group n¯ = logN , the computation cost becomes
O(N2 +m logN), as opposite to O(N2 +mN).
User communication complexity: O(N + m) The communication complexity is the same
as the the secure aggregation protocol; however, the bandwidth expansion in our scheme is
lower. Having a set of |S| users executes the secure aggregation protocol together on the set of
segments {xli}i∈S , the actual number of transmitted bits from each user i ∈ S is given by R =
|xli| log(|S|(Kg−1)+1), while just sending the quantized segments in clear without any encoding
results in |xli| log(Kg) bits. This gives us an expression for the bandwidth expansion factor⌈
log(|S|(Kg−1)+1)
⌉⌈
log(Kg)
⌉ , while ignoring the cost of sharing keys and masks and other cryptographic
aspects of the protocol3. In fact, the majority of the bandwidth expansion for the additive masking
secure aggregation protocol comes from the number of users that execute the protocol together.
In our proposed schemes, all segments are executed by either n¯ or 2n¯ users. On the other hand,
the secure aggregation protocol in [1] as we mentioned in Section II-C besides the fact that the
local model of all users are quantized by using the same quantizer, even if they have different
transmission rates, all the N users execute the secure aggregation protocol together. This implies
much larger expansion factor than our proposed schemes.
In order to further illustrate how our proposed schemes reduce the bandwidth expansion of the
state-of-the-art secure aggregation protocol, we give the following numerical explanations. We
focus in the MC scheme as it provides the highest privacy level δMC = m−2m , when the number
of subgroups equals to to the model size, Z = m. We assume having N = 214 users, and assume
without loss of generality that only one quantizer to be used by the users. When the partitioning
step results in n¯ = 7 users in each subgroup, and when using K = 216 quantization levels,
the upper bound on the expansion factor, which we calculate it by assuming that all segments
in our scheme are executed by 2n¯ even if we have some segments are executed by just n¯ for
simplicity, becomes 1.25× instead of being 1.875× for the state-of-the-art protocol. For a single
bit quantization, the expansion factor is significantly reduced from 15× to 4×.
B. Users Dropout
In order to provide perfect privacy for user’s model update, and prevent the server from
learning any segment from any individual user, the number of users in each subgroup can not be
3The costs of sharing keys and masks in our schemes are the same as in [1], so we do not consider them in the evaluation.
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less than two users. We assume that each user has a dropout probability p ∈ [0, 1]. The number
of survived users in each subgroup Xl follows a binomial distribution with parameters n¯, which
is the number of users in each subgroup, and 1− p.
Theorem 4. For a federated learning system which consists of a different number of subgroups,
where the number of users in each subgroup is given by n¯, and the dropout probability of each
user is p, the probability of having at least two survived users in each subgroup is given by
P(Xl ≥ 2) = 1−
[
n¯(1− p)pn¯−1 + pn¯] . (19)
Remark 5. We can see that the probability in (19) approaches 1 by either having a small
probability of dropout, or by increasing the number of users in each subgroup. In other words,
when the dropout rate probability p of users is high, we should have more users in each subgroup,
to protects the privacy of the local updates of users by making the probability in (19) approaches
1. By doing that we prevent the server from learning any segment from user’s local update vector.
On the other hand, for a very small probability of dropout, the probability in (19) approaches
1 with reasonable small number of users in each subgroup.
Remark 6. We can see that the number of users in each subgroup makes a trade-off between
the bandwidth expansion discussed in Section VI-A and the privacy of users’ model updates.
However, we argue that by using the proposed schemes, the dropout rate of users becomes very
small. The reason for that in our proposed schemes users take in their considerations their
transmission rates when they choose their quantizers. Note that, some methods such that the
one in [27], can be used to predict the quality of the communication channel in the current
iteration. This means that, when the transmission rates of some users are small, these users
use coarse quantizers with lower levels to transmit less bits. This decreases their probabilities
of being delayed and hence their probabilities of being considered dropped out by the server.
Another noteworthy aspect makes the assumption of having a very small probability of dropout
is the correlation between the dropout rate and the time of day. Specifically the dropout rate is
higher during the day time compared to the night time. This implies that the optimal time for
training is at night [28]. According to these discussions, we can use a reasonable small number
of users in each subgroup, and still have the probability in (19) approaches 1.
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C. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we conduct two different experiments to show the efficiency of the proposed
schemes. For the two experiments, we consider N = 20 users in the system, and we employ
mini-batch SGD with batch size 50, and a fixed learning rate 0.01. We also set the number of
local epochs for each user to be one.
1) Experiment 1: In this experiment, we evaluate the gain of using the heterogeneous quanti-
zation given by our proposed schemes when training an image classification task on the MNIST
dataset [29].
Network architecture and data distribution. We use simple multilayer-perceptron with 2-
hidden layers with 200 units each using ReLU activations (199,210 total parameters). For the
data distribution, we consider the non-iid scenario where each user is assigned samples of one
class of labels.
Quantization. We consider a set Q of G = 5 quantizers that can be used in this system with
these levels of quantization (K0, K1, K2, K3, K4) = (2, 4, 8, 10, 12). We divide the network into
G = 5 groups with n = 4 users in each group. The SS matrices for the SC scheme and the
MC scheme are given in Example 2 and Example 3, respectively. We also consider the case of
homogeneous quantization when all the segments of all users are either quantized by using the
same K = 2 levels quantizer, or K = 12 levels quantizer.
In Figure. 3a, we illustrate the performance of the MC scheme and the SC scheme versus
the two cases of homogeneous quantization. We can observe that by using the heterogeneous
quantization given by the SC scheme and the MC scheme, we achieve accuracy close to the
homogeneous quantization with K = 12 levels. Moreover, the communication time of each
round of communication with the server when using the proposed schemes is the same as the
case of homogeneous quantization with K = 2 levels and lower than the case of homogeneous
quantization with K = 12 levels with a factor of ×4. The former result comes from the fact that
the communication time in our proposed schemes is given based on the slowest group of users
that uses K = 2 levels quantizer (users in Group 0) given that the transmission rates of users
in the second group is sufficiently larger than the users in Group 0. We can also see that after
t = 100 rounds of communication with the server, the MC scheme and the SC scheme achieve
more than 10% accuracy greater than the homogeneous quantization with K = 2 levels, while
the communication time of the proposed schemes are the same as the homogeneous quantization
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(a) Experiment 1: Test accuracy with using heteroge-
neous quantization on the MNIST dataset.
(b) Experiment 2: Test accuracy in the present of Byzan-
tine users while using Fashion MNIST dataset.
Fig. 3: Test accuracy w.r.t global iteration, t.
with K = 2 levels. This confirms our motivation that by adapting the quantization levels to the
transmission rates of the users, we can achieve high accuracy with small training time. We also
see that the SC scheme is better than the MC.
2) Experiment 2: In this experiment, we show how the the secure aggregation strategy
of the MC scheme can be effective along with the coordinate-wise median operation [19]
against Byzantine users, unlike the state-of-the-art secure aggregation protocol [1]. We use image
classification task on Fashion MNIST dataset [30].
Network architecture and data distribution. We train a multi-class logistic regression model.
For the data distribution, we consider the iid scenario where we randomly split the training data
samples to N = 20 disjoint subsets, and assign each subset to a distinct user.
Attack model. We consider this two settings: 1) nB = 0, (no Byzantine users), using vanilla
model averaging, 2) nB = 1, using coordinate-wise median along with the MC scheme as we
discussed in Section V-A. We use the grouping strategy given by the 5×5 SS matrix in Example
3, where the number of users in each group is n = 4. We generate the Byzantine user in the
following way: We assume that the Byzantine user does not follow the protocol when choosing
its additive masks intentionally, or by fault. In other words, instead of using the correct 0-pairs
of masks for masking the model update of this user, an arbitrary random masks will be used. As
a result, when using the secure aggregation protocol [1], the aggregated models from all users
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will be completely distorted since the masks at the server side will not be cancelled out. For the
MC scheme proposed in this paper, only the segments from the aggregated models of any set of
users which include this Byzantine user will be distorted. For instance, if the Byzantine user is
User 1, hence according to matrix BMC in Example 3, the following given segments will be the
only distorted segments x0S0∪S1 , x
1
S0∪S2 , x
2
S0∪S3 , x
3
S0∪S4 and x
4
S0 . We model the distorted segment
by a centered Gaussian distribution with isotropic covariance matrix and standard deviation 0.1.
As we can see in Fig. 3b, the MC scheme with coordinate-wise median is very effective in the
present of that Byzantine user (incorrect masking by an individual user) and gives performance
very close to the case with no Byzantine users.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed three schemes that allow secure aggregation with heterogeneous
quantization. This enables the users to adjust their quantization proportional to their transmission
rates which can provide a substantial better trade-off between the accuracy of training and the
communication time. The proposed schemes are based on the grouping strategy by partitioning
the network into groups, and partitioning the local model updates of users into segments. Instead
of applying the secure aggregation on the entire local model update vectors, it is applied on
segments with specific coordination between users. We showed that the proposed strategy of
the proposed schemes significantly reduce the bandwidth expansion of the sate-of-the-art secure
aggregation protocol. Finally, we showed that the proposed secure aggregation schemes can be
utilized to overcome Byzantine users.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We use similar analysis to the one in [7] to find an expression of the quantization error for
the case when the local model updates of users could be quantized by any quantizer from the
set of quantizers Q. The following expectation is with respect to the quantizer
 = E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1N
N∑
i=1
x¯i − 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
1
N2
E
∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
x¯i − xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
a
=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
E||x¯i − xi||22, (20)
where (a) follows from the fact that the random quantization is i.i.d over the N local models.
E||x¯i − xi||22 b=
G−1∑
l=0
m
G∑
k=1
E(x¯li(k)− xli(k))2 c=
G−1∑
l=0
m
G∑
k=1
(
B(l + 1)− xli(k)
) (
xli(k)−B(l)
)
d≤
G−1∑
l=0
m
G∑
k=1
(B(l + 1)−B(l))2
4
=
m
G
G−1∑
l=0
(∆il)
2
4
, (21)
where (b) follows from the fact that the random quantization is i.i.d over elements of a local
updates, (c) from the variance of the quantizer in (5), and (d) from the bound in [7], which sate
that having x such that a ≤ x ≤ b, this implies (b − x)(x − a) ≤ (b−a)2
4
. Combining (20) and
(21) give us the following bound on the quantization error
 ≤ (r2 − r1)
2
4N2
m
G
N∑
i=1
G−1∑
l=0
1
(Kil − 1)2
. (22)
